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I.  Are there uncertainties that are not risks? 643.-11. Uncertainties that 
are not risks, 647. -111.  Why are some uncertainties not risks? -656. 
There has  always  been  a  good  deal  of  skepticism  about the 
behavioral significance of  Frank Knight's distinction between "meas- 
urable uncertainty"  or "risk,"  which may be represented by numeri- 
cal  probabilities,  and  "unmeasurable  uncertainty"  which  cannot. 
Knight  maintained  that the latter  "uncertainty"  prevailed -and 
hence t,hat numerical probabilities were inapplicable -in situations 
when  the decision-maker  was ignorant of  the statistical frequencies 
of  events relevant to his decision; or when a priori calculations were 
impossible; or when the relevant events were in some sense unique; 
or  when  an important,  once-and-for-all  decision  was  concerned.' 
Yet the feeling has persisted that, even in these situations, people 
tend to behave  "as though"  they assigned numerical probabilities, or 
"degrees of  belief,"  to the events impinging on their actions.  How-
ever, it is hard either to confirm or to deny such a proposition in the 
absence  of  precisely-defined  procedures for  measuring  these alleged 
"degrees of  belief." 
What might it mean operationally, in terms of  refutable predic- 
tions about observable phenomena, to say that someone behaves "as 
if"  he assigned quantitative likelihoods to events: or to say that he 
does not?  An intuitive answer may emerge if  we  consider an example 
proposed  by Shackle, who takes an extreme form of  the Knightian 
* Research for this paper was done as a member of  the Society of  Fellows, 
Haward  University,  1957.  It was  delivered  in  essentially  its present  form, 
except for Section 111, at the December meetings of  the Econometric Society, St. 
Louis,  1960.  In the recent revision of  Section 111, I have been particularly stim- 
ulated by discussions with A.  Madansky, T. Schelling, L. Shapley and S. Winter. 
1.  F. H. Knight, Rzsk, Uncertaznty and Profit  (Boston: Houghton  hlifflin, 
1921).  But see Arrow's comment: "In brief, Knight's uncertainties seem to have 
surprisingly many of  the properties of  ordinary probabilities,  and it is not clear 
how  much  is  gained by  the distinction. . . Actually,  his  uncertainties  produce 
about the same reactions in individuals as other writers ascribe to risks."  K. J. 
Arrow,  "Alternative Apprbaches to the Theory of  Choice in  Risk-taking  Situa- 
tions,"  Ewnometrzca, Vol. 19  (Oct. 1951), pp. 417, 426. 644  QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF  ECONOMICS 
position  that statistical  information  on  frequencies within  a  large, 
repetitive class  of  events is  strictly  irrelevant  to a  decision  whose 
outcome depends on a single trial.  Shackle not only rejects numerical 
probabilities  for  representing  the uncertainty  in  this  situation; he 
maintains that in situations where all the potential outcomes seem 
"perfectly possible" in the sense that they would not violate accepted 
laws and thus cause "surprise,"  it is impossible to distinguish mean- 
ingfully  (i.e., in terms of  a person's behavior, or any other observa- 
tions) between the relative "likelihoods"  of  these outcomes. In throw- 
ing a die, for instance, it would not surprise us at  all if  an ace came up 
on a single trial, nor if, on the other hand, some other number came 
up.  So Shackle concludes: 
Suppose the captains in a Test Match have agreed that instead of  tossing a coin 
for a choice of  innings they will decide the matter by this next throw of  a die, and 
that if  it  shows an ace Australia shall bat first, if  any other number, then England 
shall bat first.  Can we now give any meaningful answer whatever to the ques- 
tion, "Who will bat first?" except "We do not know?"* 
Most of  us might think we  could give better answers than that. 
We could say, "England will bat first," or more cautiously: "I think 
England will probably bat first."  And if  Shackle challenges us as to 
what we  "mean"  by that statement, it is  quite  natural  to reply: 
"We'll  bet on England; and we'll give you good odds." 
It so happens that in  this case statistical information  (on the 
behavior  of  dice)  is  available  and  does  seem  relevant  even  to a 
"single shot"  decision, our bet; it will affect the odds we  offer.  As 
Damon Runyon once said, "The race is not always to the swift nor 
the battle to the strong, but that's the way to bet."  However, it is 
our bet itself, and not the reasoning and evidence that lies behind it, 
that gives operational meaning  to our  statement that we  find  one 
outcome  "more  likely"  than another.  And  we  may be  willing  to 
place  bets -thus  revealing  "degrees  of  belief"  in  a  quantitative 
form -about events for which there is no statistical information at 
all,  or  regarding  which  statistical  information  seems  in  principle 
unobtainable.  If  our  pattern  of  bets were suitably  orderly -if  it 
2. G.  L. S. Shackle,  Uncertainty in Economics  (London: Cambridge Uni- 
versity  Press,  1955), p.  8.  If  this  example were  not  typical  of  a  number  of 
Shackle's works, it would seem almost unfair to cite it, since it appears so trans- 
parently  inconsistent  with  commonly-observed  behavior.  Can  Shackle  really 
believe that an Australian captain who cared about batting first would be indiffer-
ent  between staking this outcome on "heads"  or on an ace? RISK, AMBIGUITY, AND THE  SAVAGE AXIOMS  645 
satisfied  certain  postulated  constraints -it  would  be  possible  to 
infer for ourselves  numerical  subjective probabilities  for events, in 
terms of  which some future decisions could be predicted or described. 
Thus a good deal -perhaps all -of  Knight's class of  "unmeasurable 
uncertainties"  would have succumbed to measurement, and "risk" 
would prevail instead of  "uncertainty." 
A number of  sets of  constraints on choice-behavior under uncer- 
tainty have ncw been proposed, all more or less equivalent or closely 
similar in spirit, having the implication that -for a "rational"  man 
-all uncertainties can be reduced to  Their flavor is suggested 
by Ramsay's  early notions that, "The  degree of  a belief  is . . . the 
extent to which we are prepared to  act upon it," and "The probability 
of  1I3 is clearly. related to the kind of  belief which would lead to a bet 
of  2  to  Starting from  the notion  that gambling  choices are 
influenced by, or  "reflect,"  differing degrees of  belief, this approach 
sets out to infer those beliefs from the actual choices.  Of  course, in 
general  those choices reveal  not only the person's  relative expecta- 
tions but his relative preferences for outcomes; there is a problem of 
distinguishing between these.  But if  one picks the right choices to 
observe, and if  the Savage postulates  or  some  equivalent  set  are 
found to be satisfied,  this distinction can be made unambiguously, 
and  either  qualitative  or,  ideally,  numerical  probabilities  can  be 
determined.  The propounders  of  these axioms tend to be  hopeful 
that the rules will be commonly satisfied, at least roughly and most 
of  the  time,  because  they  regard  these  postulates  as  normative 
maxims, widely-acceptable  principles of  rational behavior.  In other 
words, people should tend to behave in the postulated fashion, because 
that is the way they would want  to behave.  At the least, these axioms 
3. F. P. Ramsey, "Truth  and Probability"  (1926) in  The Foundations  of 
Mathematics and  Other Logical  Essays, ed. R. B. Braithwaite  (New York: Har- 
court Brace, 1931); L. J. Savage, The Foundations of  Statistics (New York: Wiley, 
1954); B. de Finetti, "Recent  Suggestions for the Reconciliation  of  Theories of 
Probability."  pp. 217-26  of  Proceedings of  the Second  (1960)Berkeley Symposium 
on Mathematical  Statzstics and Probabzlity, Berkeley,  1951; P. Suppes, D. David-
son, and S. Siegel, Deczsion-Making  (Stanford University Press,  1957).  Closely 
related approaches, in which individual choice behavior is presumed to be stochas- 
tic, have been developed by R. D. Luce, Individual Choice Behavior  (New York: 
Wiley, 1959),  and J. S. Chipman, "Stochastic Choice and Subjective Probability," 
in  Decisions,  Values and  Groups, ed.  D. Willner  (New York:  Pergamon  Press, 
1960).  Although the argument in this paper applies equally well to these latter 
stochastic axiom systems, they will not be discussed explicitly. 
4.  Ramsey, op. cit., p. 171. 646  QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF  ECONOMICS 
are believed  to predict certain choices that people will  make wher 
they take plenty of  time to reflect over their decision, in the light o 
the postulates. 
In considering  only  deliberate decisions,  then, does  this leavc 
any room  at all  for  ('unmeasurable uncertainty":  for  uncertaintie 
not reducible to "risks,"  to quantitative or qualitative probabilities' 
A  side effect of  the axiomatic  approach is that it supplies, a 
last (as Knight did not), a useful operational meaning to the proposi 
tion  that  people  do  not  always  assign,  or  act  "as  though"  the. 
assigned, probabilities to uncertain events.  The meaning would b 
that with respect to certain events they did not obey, nor did the. 
wish to obey -even on  rejection -Savage's postulates or equivalen 
rules.  One could emphasize here either that the postulates failed t 
be  acceptable in  those  circumstances  as normative  rules,  or  tha 
they failed to predict reflective choices; I tend to be more interestel 
in the latter aspect, Savage no doubt in the former.  (A third infer 
ence, which H. Raiffa favors, could be that people need more drill o 
the importance  of  conforming  to the Savage  axioms.)  But fror 
either point of  view, it would follow that there would be szmpl!l no wa 
to infer meaningful probabilzties for  those events from their choices, an 
theories which purported  to describe  their  uncertainty in  terms ( 
probabilities would be  quite inapplicable in that area  (unless quit 
different operations for measuring probability were devised).  1LIon 
over, such people could not be described as maximizing the math< 
matical expectation of  utility on the basis of  numerical probabilitic 
for those events derived on  any basis.  Xor would it be  possible t 
derive numerical  "von  Keumann-Rlorgenstern"  utilities  from  the 
choices among gambles involving those events. 
I propose to indicate a class of  choice-situations in which man 
otherwise reasonable people neither wish nor tend to conform to tf 
Savage postulates, nor to the other axiom sets that have been devise( 
But the implications of  such a finding, if  true, are not wholly destru~ 
tive.  First, both the predictive and normative use of  the Savage ( 
equivalent postulates might  be  improved  by avoiding attempts t 
apply them in certain, specifiable circumstances where they do nc 
seem acceptable.  Second, we  might hope that it is precisely in suc 
circumstances that certain proposals for alternative decision rules ar 
nonprobabilistic descriptions of  uncertainty (e.g.,  by Knight, Shack1 
Hurwicz, and Hodges and Lehmann) might prove fruitful.  I believ 
in fact, that this is the case. RISK, AMBIGUITY, AND THE SAVAGE -AXIOMS  647 
Which  of  two events, a, P,  does an individual consider  "more 
likely"?  In the Ramsey-Savage  approach,  the basic  test  is:  On 
which event would he prefer  to stalce a prize, or to place  a given bet2  By 
the phrase, "to offer a bet on a" we shall mean: to make available an 
action with  consequence  a  if  a occurs  (or, as Savage puts it, if  a 
"obtains")  and b if  a does not occur  (i.e., if  a, or  "notca"  occurs), 
where a is preferable to b. 
Suppose, then, that we  offer  a subject alternative bets "on"  a 
and "on"  p (a,p need not be either mutually exclusive or exhaustive, 
but for convenience we  shall assume in all illustrations that they are 
mutually exclusive). 
Events 







The Ramsey-Savage proposal is to interpret the person's prefer- 
ence between I and I1 as revealing the relative likelihood he assigns 
to a and P.  If  he does not definitely prefer I1 to I,  it is to be inferred 
that he regards a as "not less probable than"  P, which we will write: 
ff  2  P 
For example, in the case of  Shackle's illustration, we might be 
allowed to bet either that England will bat first or that Australia will 
(these two  events  being  complementary),  staking  a  $10  prize  in 
either case: 
England first  Australia first 
If the event were to be  determined by the toss of  a die, England to 
bat first if  any number but an ace turned up, I would strongly prefer 
gamble 1 (and if  Shackle should really claim indifference between I 
and 11, I would be anxious to make a side bet with him).  If, on the 
other hand, the captains were to toss a coin, I would be indifferent 
between the two bets.  In the first case an observer might infer, on 
the basis of the Ramsey-Savage  axioms, that I regarded England as 648  QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF  ECONOMICS 
more likely to bat first than Australia (or, an ace as less likely than 
not to come up); in the second case, that I regarded heads and tails 
as "equally likely." 
That inference would, in fact, be a little hasty.  My indifference 
in the second case would indeed indicate that I assigned kqual prob- 
abilities to heads and tails, if I assigned any  probabilities  at all to those 
events; but the latter condition would  remain to be proved,  and it 
would take further choices to prove it.  I might, for example, be a 
"minimaxer,"  whose  indifference  between  the  two  bets  merely 
reflected the fact that their respective "worst  outcomes"  were identi- 
cal.  To rule out such possibilities, it would be necessary to examine 
my pattern of  preferences in a number  of  well-chosen  cases, in the 
light of  certain axiomatic constraints. 
In order for any relationship@among  events to have the prop- 
erties of  a "qualitative probability relationship," it must be true that: 
(a)@is  a complete ordering  over events; for any two events 
a, p, either a is "not less probable than"  P, or P is "not less probable 
than" a,and if  a 3 p and fl 3 y, then a 3 y. 
(b) If  a is more probable than P,  then "not-a"  (or, a) is less 
probable than not-p (8); if  a is equally probable to a, and P is equally 
probable to P, then a is equally probable to P. 
(c) If  a and y are mutually exclusive, and so are 0and y (i.e., 
if  any  = P n  y  = 0), and if  a is more probable than 0, then the 
union (a  (J y) is more probable than (0  7). 
as above from choices among gambles, will 
Savage proves that the relationship R
3  among events, inferred 
ave the above properties 
if  the individual's pattern of  choices obeys certain postulates.  To 
indicate some of  these briefly: 
1'1:  Complete ordering of  gambles, or "actions."  In the exam- 
ple below either I is preferred to 11, I1 is preferred to I, or I and I1 
are indifferent.  If  I is preferred to 11, and I1 is preferred or indiffer- 
ent to 111, then I is preferred to I11 (not shown). 
a  P  anB 
P2: The choice between two actions must be unaffected by the 
value of  pay-offs corresponding to events for which both actions have 
the sume pay-off  (i.e., by the value of pay-offs in a constant column). RISK, AMBIGUITY, AND  THE SAVAGE AXIOMS  649 
Thus, if the subject preferred I to I1 in the example above, he should 
prefer 111 to IV, below, when a and b are unchanged and c takes any 
value : 
a  P  6nP 
This corresponds to Savage's  Postulate 2, which  he  calls  the 
"Sure-thing  Principle"  and which bears great weight in the analysis. 
One rationale for it amounts to the following: Suppose that u person 
would  not prefer  IV to I11 if  he knew that the third column would 
not "obtain";  if, on the other hand, he knew that the third column 
would obtain, he would still not prefer  IV to 111, since the pay-offs 
(whatever they are) are equal.  So, since he would  not prefer IV to 
111 "in either event," he should not prefer IV when he does not know 
whether or not the third column will obtain. 
"Except possibly for the assumption of simple ordering," Savage 
asserts, "I know of  no other extralogical principle governing decisions 
that finds such ready ac~eptance."~ 
P4: The choice in the above example must be independent  of 
the values of  a and b, given their ordering.  Thus, preferring I to 11, 
the subject should prefer V to VI below, when d  > e: 
a  P  &nP 
This is Savage's Postulate 4, the independence of  probabilities and 
pay-offs.  Roughly, it specifies that the choice of event on which a 
5.  Op. Git., p. 21.  Savage notes that the principle, in the form of the ration- 
ale above, "cannot appropriately be accepted as a postulate in the sense that P1 
is, because it would introduce new undefined technical terms referring to knowl- 
edge and possibility  that would  render it mathematically  useless  without  still 
more postulates governing these terms."  He substitutes for it a postulate cor- 
responding to P2 above as expressing the same intuitive constraint.  Savage's P2 
corresponds closely to "Rubin's  Postulate"  (Luce and Raiffa,  Games and  Deci-
sions; New York: Wiley, 1957, p. 290) or Milnor's "Column Linearity" postulate, 
ibid.,  p. 297,  which implies t>hat  adding a constant t,o a column of  pay.offs should 
not change the preference ordering among acts. 
If numerical  probabilities  were assumed  known,  so  that the subject were 
dealing explicitly with known "risks,"  these postulates would amount to Samuel- 
son's "Special  Independence Assumption"  ("Probability,  Utility, and the Inde- 
pendence  Axiom,"  Ewnometrica,  Vol.  20  (Oct.  1952), pp.  670-781,  on which 
Samuelson relies heavily in his derivation of  "von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities." 650  QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF  ECONOiIfICS 
person  prefers to stake a prize should not be affected by the size of 
the prize. 
In combination  with a  "noncontroversial"  Postulate  P3 (cor-
responding  to "admissibility,"  the rejection of  dominated actions), 
these four postulates, if  generally satisfied by the individual's choices, 
imply that his preference for I over I1 (or I11 over IV, or V over VI) 
may safely be interpreted as sufficient evidence that he regards a us 
"not less probable than" 0; the relationship "not less probable than" 
thus operationally dejned, will have all the properties of  a "qualitative 
probability relationship."  (Other postulates, which will not be con- 
sidered here, are necessary in order to establish numerical probabili- 
ties.)  In general, as one ponders  these postulates and tests them 
introspectively in a variety of  hypothetical situations, they do indeed 
appear plausible.  That is to say that they do seem  to have wide 
validity as normative criteria (for me, as well as for Savage); they 
are probably6 roughly accurate in predicting certain aspects of  actual 
choice behavior in many situations and better yet in predicting reflec- 
tive behavior in those situations.  To the extent this is true, it should 
be possible to infer from certain gambling choices in those situations 
at  least a qualitative probability relationship over events, correspond- 
ing to a given person's "degrees of  belief." 
Let us now consider some situations in which the Savage axioms 
do not  seem so plausible: circumstances in which none of  the above 
conclusions may appear valid. 
Consider the following hypothetical experiment.  Let us suppose 
that you confront two urns containing red and black balls, from one 
of  \\hich  a  ball  will  be  drawn  at random.  To "bet on RedI" will 
mean that you choose to draw from Urn I;  and that you will receive 
a prize a (say $100) if  you draw a red ball  ("if  RedI occurs")  and a 
smaller amount b (say, $0) if  you draw a black ("if  not-RedI occurs"). 
You have the following information.  Urn I contains 100 red and 
black  balls, but in a ratio entirely unknown  to you; there may be 
from 0 to 100 red balls.  In Urn 11, you confirm that there are exactly 
50 red and 50 black balls.  An observer -ivho, let us say, is ignorant 
of  the state of  your information about the urns -sets out to measure 
your subjective probabilities by interrogating you as to your prefer- 
ences in the following pairs of  gambles: 
1.  "Which  do you prefer to bet on, RedI or Black1: or are you 
indifferent?"  That is, drawing a ball from Urn I, on which "event" 
do you prefer the $100 stake, red or black: or do you care? RISK, AAIBZGI'ZTY,  AND  THE SAVAGE AXIOMS  65 1 
2.  "Which would you prefer to  bet on, RedII  or BlackII?" 
3. "Which do you prefer to  bet on, RedI or RedII?"7 
4.  "Which do you prefer to bet on, BlackI or BlackII?,'8 
Let us suppose that in both the first case and the second case, 
you  are indifferent  (the typical  r~sponse).~  Judging from  a  large 
number of  responses, under r~bsolutely  lionexperimental conditions, 
your :Lnswers  to the last two questions are likely to fall into one of 
three groups.  You may still be indifferent within each pair of  options. 
(If so, you nlay sit back now and watch for awhile.)  But if  you are 
in the rn:~jority,  you will report that you prefer to bet on RedII rather 
th:m  RedI, and BlackII rather th:ui  BlackI.  The preferences  of  a 
snlall miriority run the other way, preferring bets on  RedI to RedII, 
and BlackI to Black11. 
If  you are in either of  these latter groups, you are now in trouble 
with the Savage axioms. 
Suppose that, betting on red, you preferred to draw out of  Urn 
11.  Iin observer,  applying  the  basic  rule  of  the  Ramsey-Savage 
approach, would infer tentatively that you regarded RedII as "more 
probable th:~n" RedI.  He then observes that you also prefer to bet 
on BlackrI rather than Blackl.  Since he cannot conclude that you 
regard  RedII as more  probable  than RedI and, at the same time, 
110t-Ilcd~~  this being inconsistent  as more probable than not-RedI -
with the essential properties of  probability relationships -he must 
conclude  that your  choices  are not  revealing judgments  of  "prob-
ability"  at all.  So far as these events are concerned, it is impossible 
to infer  probabilities  from  your  choices;  you  must  inevitably  be 
vio1:~ting  some of  the Savage axioms (specifically, P1 and P2, com- 
plete ordering of  actions or the Sure-thing Principle).' 
7.  Note that in no case are you invited to choose both a color and an urn 
freely; nor are you given any indication  beforehand as to the full set of  gambles 
that will  be offered.  If  these conditions were altered (as in some of  H. Raiffa's 
experiments with students), you could  employ  randomized  strategies,  such as 
flipping a coin to determine what color to bet on in  Urn I, which  might affect 
your choices. 
8. See immediately preceding note. 
9.  Here  we  see  the  advantages of  purely  hypothetical  experiments.  In 
"real  life," you would probably turn out to have a profound color preference that 
would invalidate the whole first set of  trials, and various other biases that would 
show up one by one as the experimentation progressed  inconclusively. 
However,  the results  in  Chipman's  almost  identical  experiment  (op.  cit., 
pp. 87-88)  do give strong support to this finding; Chipman's explanatory hypoth- 
esis differs from that proposed below. 
1. In order to relate these choices clearly to the postulates, let us change 
the experimental setting slightly.  Let us assume that the balls in Urn I are each 652  QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF  ECONOMICS 
marked with a I, and the balls in Urn 11 with a 11; the contents of  both urns are 
then dumped into a single urn,  which  then contains 50 RedII balls,  50 BlackIl 
balls, and 100 Red1 and Blackr balls in unknown proportion  (or in a proportion 
indicated only by a small random sample, say, one red and one black).  The fol- 
lowing actions are to be considered: 
R1  Bl  R11  B11 
I  a b b b 
I1  b a b b 
I11  b b a b 
IV  b b b a 
V  a a b b 
VI  b b a a 
Let  us  assume  that  a  person  is  indifferent  between  I  and I1 (between betting 
on R, or B,), hetwcen I11 and IV and bet~een  V and VI.  It would  then  follow 
from Postulates 1and 2, the assumption ot a complete ordering of  actions and the 
Sure-thing Principle, that I, 11, 111 and IV arc all indifferent to each other. 
To indicate the nature of  the proof, suppose that I is preferred to I11 (the 
person  prefers  to bet on RI rather than RII).  Postulates  1 and 2 imply that 
certain transformations can be performed on this pair of  actions without ajecting 
their  preference  ordering;  specifically,  one action can  be  replaced  by  an action 
indifferent to it (PI -complete ordering) and the value of  a constant column 
can be changed  (P2 -Sure-thing Principle). 
Thus starting with I and 111 and performing such "admissible  transforma- 
tions" it would follow from P1 and P2 that the first action in each of the following 















































P  2 
I""  b b a b P 1 
111""  a b b b 
Contradiction: I preferred to 111, and I""  (equivalent to 111) preferred  to 
111""  (equivalent to I). RISK, AMBIGUITY, AND THE SAVAGE AXIOMS  653 
The same applies if  you  preferred  to bet on  RedI and BlackI 
rather than RedII or BlackII.  Moreover, harking back to your earlier 
(hypothetical) replies,  any one of  these preferences  involves you  in 
conflict with the axioms.  For if  one is to interpret from your answers 
to the first two questions that RedI is "equally likely"  to not-RedI, 
and RedII is equally likely to not-RedII, then Redl (or BlackI) should 
be  equally  likely to Red11 (or to BlackII), and any preference  for 
drawing from one urn over the other leads to a contradicti~n.~ 
It might be  objected  that the assumed  total ignorance of  the 
ratio of  red and black balls in Urn I is an unrealistic  condition, lead- 
ing to erratic decisions.  Let us suppose instead that you have been 
allowed to draw a random sample of  two balls from Urn I, and that 
you have drawn one red and one black.  Or a sample of  four: two red 
and two black.  Such conditions do not seem to change the observed 
pattern of  choices appreciably (although the reluctance to draw from 
Urn I goes down somewhat, as shown for example, by the amount a 
subject will  pay  to draw  from  Urn  I;  this still remains well below 
what he will  pay for Urn  11).  The same conflicts with the axioms 
appear. 
Long after beginning  these observations, I discovered  recently 
that Knight had postulated an identical comparison, between a man 
who knows that there are red and black balls in an urn but is ignorant 
of  the numbers of  each, and another who knows their exact propor- 
tion.  The results indicated above directly contradict Knight's  own 
intuition about the situation: "It must be admitted that practically, 
if  any decision as to conduct is involved, such as a wager,  the first 
man would have to act on the supposition that the chances are equaLn3 
If  indeed people were compelled to act on the basis of  some Principle 
of  Insufficient Reason when they lacked statistical information, there 
would be little interest in Knight's own distinctions between risk and 
uncertainty  so far as conduct was  involved.  But as many people 
predict  their own  conduct in such hypothetical situations, they do 
not feel obliged to act "as if"  they assigned probabilities at all, equal 
or not, in this state of  ignorance. 
Another example yields a direct test of  one of  the Savage postu- 
lates.  Imagine an urn known to contain 30 red balls and 60 black 
and yellow balls, the latter in unknown proportion.  (Alternatively, 
imagine that a sample of  two drawn from the 60 black and yellow 
2. See immediately preceding note. 
3. Knight, op. at.,p. 219. 654 
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balls has resulted in one black  and one yellow.)  One ball  is to be 
drawn at random from the urn; the following actions are considered: 
,--A-
Red  Black  Yellow 
I  $100  $0  $0 
I1  $0  $100  $0 
Action I is "a bet on red," I1  is "a bet on black."  Which do you prefer? 
Now  consider  the following  two  actions, under  the same cir-
cumstances: 
30  60 
r.---h-p 
Red  Black  Yellow 
I11  $100  $0  $100 
IV  $0  $100  $100 
Action 111 is a "bet on red or yellow"; IV is a "bet on black or yellow." 
Which of  these do you prefer?  Take your time! 
X very frequent pattern of  response is: action I preferred to 11, 
a~ld  IV preferred to 111.  Less frequent is: I1 preferred to I, and I11 
preferred  to IV.  Both of  these, of  course, violate the Sure-thing 
I'rinciple,  which requires the ordering of  I to I1 to be preserved in 
I11 and IV  (since the two  pairs differ  only in  their  third column, 
constant for each pair).4  The first pattern, for example, implies that 
the subject prefers to bet "on"  red rather than "on"  black; and he 
also  prefers  to bet  "against"  red  rather  than  "against"  black.  A 
relationship "more  likely than"  inferred from his choices mould  fail 
condition (b) above of  a "qualitative probability relationship," since 
it would indicate that he regarded red as more likely than black, but 
4.  Kenneth Arrow has suggested the following example, in the spirit of  the 
above one: 


























L4ssurne that I is indifferent to IV, I1 is indifferent to 111.  Suppose that I 
is prefrrred to 11; what is the ordering of  I11 and IVY  If  111 is not prrferred to 
IV, P2, the Stire-thing Prinriplr is violated.  If  IV is.  not preferred to 111, PI, 
con~plete  ordering of  :tc-tior~s,  is vio1:~ted.  (If 111 is indilferent to IV, both P1 :tnd 
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also "not-red"  as more likely than "not-black."  Moreover, he would 
be acting "as though"  he regarded "red or yellow"  as less likely than 
"black  or  yellow,"  although red  were  more likely  than black,  and 
red, yellow  and black  were  mutually exclusive, thus violating  con- 
dition (c) above. 
Once again, it is impossible, on the basis of  such choices, to infer 
even qualitative probabilities for the events in question (specifically, 
for events that include yellow  or  black, but not both).  Moreover, 
for  any vallies  of  the pay-offs,  it is  impossible  to find  probability 
numbers in terms of  which these choices could be described -even 
roughly or approximately -as maximizing the mathkmatical expec- 
tation of  ~tility.~ 
You might now pause to reconsider your replies.  If  you should 
repent of  your  violations -if  you  should decide that your choices 
implying conflicts with the axioms were  "mistakes"  and that your 
"real"  preferences, upon reflection, involve no such inconsistencies -
you  confirm  that the Savage postulates are, if  not descriptive rules 
for you, your normatil~e  criteria in these situations.  But this is by no 
means a universal reaction; on the contrary, it would be exceptional. 
Responses  do vary.  There are those who  do not  violate  the 
axioms, or say they won't, even in these situations (e.g., G. Debreu, 
11. Schlaiffer, 1'.  Samuelson); such subjects tend to apply the axioms 
rather than their intuition, and when in doubt, to apply some form 
of  the  Principle  of  Insufficient  Reason.  Some violate  the axioms 
cheerfully, even with gusto (J. hlarschak, N. Dalkey) ; others sadly 
but persistently, having looked into their hearts, found conflicts with 
the  axioms  and  decided,  in  Samuelson's  phra~e,~ satisfy  their  to 
5.  Let the utility pay-off8 corresponding to $100 and $4 be 1, 0;  let PI,  P,, 
P, be the probabilities corresponding to red, yellow-, black.  The expected value 
to action I is then P,;  to 11, Pp; to 111, P, + P,; to IV, P, + P,.  But there are 
no P's, Pi2 0,  ZPi = 1, such that P, > P, and PI + P, < P, + P,. 
6. P. Samuelson, "Probability  and the Attempts to hteasure Utility,"  The 
Economic Review (Tokyo, Japan),  July 1950, pp. 169-70. 
To test the predictive effectiveness of the axioms (or of  the alternate deci- 
sion rule to be proposed in the next section) in these situations, controlled experi- 
mentation is in order.  (See Chipman's  ingenious experiment, op. cit.)  But, as 
Savage remarks  (op. cit., p. 28), the mode of  interrogation  implied  here and in 
Savage's hook, asking "the person not how he feels, but what he would do in such 
and such a situation" and giving him ample opportunity to ponder the implica- 
tions  of  his  replies,  seems  quite  appropriate  in  weighing  "the  theory's  more 
important normative interpretation."  Moreover, these nonexperimental ohserva- 
tions can have at  least negative empirical implications, since there is a presump- 
tion  that people  whose instinctive choices violate t,he Savage axioms,  and who 
claim upon further reflection  that they do not want to obey them, do not tend to 
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preferences and let the axioms satisfy themselves.  Still others (H. 
Raiffa) tend, intuitively, to violate the axioms but feel guilty about 
it and go back into further analysis. 
The important finding is that, after rethinking all their "offend- 
ing"  decisions in the light of  the axioms, a number of  people who are 
not only sophisticated but reasonable decide that they wish to persist 
in their choices.  This includes people who previously felt a  "first-
order commitment" to the axioms, many of them surprised and some 
dismayed to find that they wished, in these situations, to violate the 
Sure-thing Principle.  Since this group included L. J. Savage, when 
last tested by me (I have been reluctant to try him again), it seems 
to deserve respectful consideration. 
Individuals who would choose I over I1 and IV over I11 in the 
example above (or, I1 over I and I11 over IV) are simply not acting 
"as though" they assigned numerical or even qualitative probabilities 
to the events in  question.  There are, it turns out, other ways for 
them to act.  But what are they doing? 
Even with so few observations, it is possible to say some other 
things they are not doing.  They are not ''rninirna~ing~~;  nor are they 
applying a  LLHurwicz  criterion,"  maximizing  a weighted average of 
minimum  pay-off  and maximum  for  each  strategy.  If  they were 
following any such rules they would have been indifferent between 
each pair  of  gambles, since all have identical minima and maxima. 
Moreover,  they  are  not  "minimaxing  regret,"  since  in  terms  of 
"regrets"  the pairs 1-11  and 111-IV  are identi~al.~ 
Thus, none of  the familiar criteria for predicting  or prescribing 
decision-making  under  uncertainty  corresponds  to this  pattern  of 
choices.  Yet the choices themselves do not appear to be careless or 
random.  They are persistent, reportedly deliberate, and they seem 
to predominate empirically; many of  the people who take them are 
eminently reasonable, and they insist that they want to behave this 
way, even though they may be  generally respectful  of  the Savage 
axioms.  There are strong indications, in other words, not merely of 
the existence of  reliable patterns of blind behavior but of  the opera- 
7.  No one whose decisions were based on "regrets"  could violate the Sure- 
thing Principle, since all constant columns of pay-offs would transform to a column 
of 0's  in terms of "regret";  on the other hand, such a person  would violate PI, 
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tion of definite normative criteria, different  from and conflicting with 
the familiar ones, to which these people are trying to conform.  If we 
are talking about you, among others, we might call on your introspec- 
tion once again.  What did you think you were doing?  What were 
you trying to do? 
One thing to be explained is the fact that you  probably  would 
not violate the axioms in certain other situations.  In the urn example, 
although a person's  choices may not allow us to infer a probability 
for yellow, or  for  (red  or black), we  may be able to deduce quite 
definitely that he regards (yellow or black) as "more likely than" red; 
in fact, we might be able to arrive at  quite precise numerical estimates 
for his probabilities, approximating 2/3, 1/3.  What is the difference 
between  these uncertainties, that leads to such different behavior? 
Responses from confessed violators indicate that the difference 
is  not  to be  found  in  terms of  the two factors commonly used  to 
determine a choice situation, the relative desirability of  the possible 
pay-offs and the relative likelihood of  the events affecting them, but 
in a third dimension  of  the problem  of  choice: the nature of  one's 
information concerning the relative likelihood of  events.  What is at 
issue might  be  called  the ambiguity of  this information, a  quality 
depending  on  the  amount,  type,  reliability  and  "unanimity"  of 
information, and giving  rise  to one's  degree of  "confidence"  in  an 
estimate of  relative likelihoods. 
Such  rules  as  minimaxing,  maximaxing,  Hurwicz  criteria  or 
minimaxing regret are usually prescribed for situations of  "complete 
ignorance,"  in which a decision-maker  lacks any information  what- 
ever on relative likelihoods.  This would be the case in our urn example 
if  a subject had no basis  for considering  any of  the possible prob- 
ability distributions over red, yellow, black -such as (1,0,0), (0,1,0), 
(0,0,1) -as a better estimate, or basis for decision, than any other. 
On  the other hand, the Savage axioms, and the general "Bayesian" 
approach, are unquestionably appropriate when a subject is willing to 
base his decisions on a definite and  precisechoice of  a particular distri- 
bution: his  uncertainty in such a situation is unequivocally  in the 
form of  "risk." 
But the state of  information in our urn example can be charac- 
teriied neither as "ignorance"  nor "risk"  in these senses.  Each sub- 
ject  does know enough about the problem to rule out  a number of 
possible distributions, including a11 three mentioned above.  He knows 
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in fact, he knows that exactly 1/3 of  the balls are red.  Thus, in his 
"choice"  of  a  subjective probability  distribution  over  red, yellow, 
black -if  he wanted such an estimate as a basis for decision -he is 
limited to the set of  potential distributions between (1/3, 2/3, 0) and 
(1/3, 0, 2/3) : i.e., to the infinite set  (1/3,X,  2/3-X),  0 <X < 2/3. 
Lacking any observations on the number of  yellow or black balls, he 
may have little or no information indicating that one of  the remain- 
ing, infinite set  of  distributions is  more  "likely,"  more  worthy of 
attention than any other.  If  he should accumulate some observa- 
tions, in the form of  small sample distributions, this set of  "reason- 
able"  distributions  would  diminish,  and  a  particular  distribution 
might gather increasing strength as a candidate; but so long as the 
samples remain small, he may be far from able to select one from a 
number of  distributions, or  one composite distribution, as a unique 
basis for decision. 
In some situations where two or more probability distributions 
over the states of  nature seem reasonable, or possible, it may still be 
possible to draw on different sorts of  evidence, establishing probability 
weights  in turn to these different  distributions to arrive at a final, 
composite distribution.  Even in our examples, it would be mislead- 
ing  to place  much  emphasis  on  the notion  that a  subject  has no 
information about the contents of  an urn on which no observations 
have been made.  The subject can always ask himself: "What is the 
likelihood that the experimenter has rigged this urn?  Assuming that 
he has, what proportion of  red balls did he probably set?  If  he is try- 
ing to trick me, how is he going about it?  What other bets is he going 
to offer me?  What sort of  results is he after?" If  he has had a lot of 
experience with psychological tests before, he may be able to bring to 
bear a good deal of  information and intuition that seems relevant to 
the problem  of  weighting  the different hypotheses,  the alternative 
reasonable probability distributions.  In the end, these weights, and 
the resulting  composite probabilities, may or may not be equal for 
the different  possibilities.  In our examples, actual subjects do tend 
to be indifferent between betting on red or black in the unobserved 
urn, in the first case, or between betting  on  yellow  or black in the 
second.  This need not at a11  mean that they felt "completely  igno- 
rant" or that they could think of  no reason to favor one or the other; 
it does indicate that the reasons, if  any, to favor one or  the other 
balanced out subjectively so that the possibilities entered into their 
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Let us assume, for purposes of  discussion, that an individual can 
always assign relative weights to alternative probability distributions 
reflecting the relative  support given by his information, experience 
and intuition to these rival  hypotheses.  This implies  that he  can 
always assign relative likelihoods to the states of  nature.  But how 
does he act in  the presence of  his uncertainty?  The answer to that 
may depend on another sort of  judgment, about the reliability, credi- 
bility, or adequacy of  his information (including his relevant experi- 
ence, advice and intuition) as a whole: not about the relative support 
it may give to one hypothesis as opposed to another, but about its 
ability to lend support to any hypothesis at all. 
If a11  the information about the events in a set of  gambles were 
in the form of  sample-distributions,  then ambiguity might be closely 
related, inversely, to the size of  the  ample.^  But sample-size is not 
a universally useful index  of  this factor.  Information about many 
events cannot be  conveniently  described  in  terms of  a  sample dis- 
tribution; moreover, sample-size seems to focus mainly on the quan- 
tity of  information.  "Ambiguity"  may be high  (and the confidence 
in any particular estimate of  probabilities low) even where there is 
ample quantity of  information, when there are questions of  reliability 
and relevance  of  information, and particularly  where  there is con-
JEicting opinion and evidence. 
This judgment  of  the ambiguity  of  one's  information, of  the 
over-all credibility of  one's composite estimates, of  one's confidence 
in them, cannot be expressed in terms of  relative likelihoods or events 
(if  it could, it would simply affect the final, compound probabilities). 
Any scrap of  evidence bearing on relative likelihood should already 
be represented in those estimates.  But having exploited knowledge, 
guess, rumor, assumption, advice, to arrive at  a final judgment that 
8. See Chipman, op.  cit.,  pp. 75, 93.  Chipman's important work  in  this 
area, done independently and largely prior to mine, is not discussed here since it 
embodies a st,ochastic theory of  choice; its spirit is otherwise closely similar to that 
of  the present  approach, and his  experimental  results  are both  pertinent  and 
favorable to the hypotheses below  (though Chipman's inferences are somewhat 
different). 
See also the comments by N. Georgescu-Roegen on notion of  "credibility," 
a concept identical to "ambiguity"  in this paper: "The  Nature of  Expectation 
and Uncertainty,"  in Expectations, Uncertainty, and Business Behavior, ed. Mary 
Bowman, Social Science Research Council  (h'ew- York, 1958), pp.  2-1-26;  and 
"Choice,  Expectations and Sfeasurability,"  this Journal, LXVIII (Sov. 1954), 
527-30.  These highly  pertinent  articles came to my attention  only after this 
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one event is more likely than another or that they are equally likely, 
one can still stand back from this process and ask: "How  much, in 
the end, is all this worth?  How much do I really know about the 
problem?  How firm a basis for choice, for appropriate decision and 
action, do I have?"  The answer, "I don't know very much, and I 
can't  rely on that,"  may sound rather familiar, even in connection 
with markedly unequal estimates  of  relative likelihood.  If  "com-
plete ignorance"  is rare or nonexistent,  "considerable"  ignorance is 
surely not. 
Savage himself  alludes to this sort of  judgment and notes as a 
difficulty with his approach that no recognition is given to it: 
. . .  there seem to be some probability  relations about which we  feel relatively 
"sure"  as compared with  others. . . The notion of  "sure"  and "unsure"  intro-
duced here is vague,  and my complaint is precisely  that neither  the theory of 
personal probability, as it is developed in this book, nor any other device known 
to me renders the notion less vague. . . A second difficulty, perhaps closely asso- 
ciated with the first one, stems from the vagueness associated with judgments of 
the magnitude of  personal pr~bability.~ 
Knight asserts what Savage's approach tacitly denies, that such 
over-all judgments may influence decision : 
The action which follows upon an opinion depends as much upon the amount of 
confidence in that opinion as it does upon the favorableness of  the opinion itself 
. . . Fidelity to the actual psychology of  the situation  requires, we must insist, 
recognition  of  these two  separate  exercises  of  judgment,  the formation  of  an 
eatimate and the estimation of  its value.' 
Let us imagine a situation in which so many of  the probability 
judgments an individual can bring to bear upon a particular problem 
are either "vague"  or  "unsure"  that his  confidence in a particular 
assignment  of  probabilities,  as opposed  to some  other  of  a  set of 
"reasonable"  distributions, is very low.  We  may define this as a 
situation of  high ambiguity.  The general proposition to be explored 
below is that it is precisely in situations of  this sort that self-consistent 
behavior violating the Savage axioms may commonly occur. 
Ambiguity is a subjective variable, but it should be possible to 
identify "objectively"  some situations likely  to present  high  ambi- 
guity, by noting situations where available information is scanty or 
9.  Savage, op. cit., pp. 57-58,59.  Savage later goes so far as to suggest (op. 
cit., pp.  168-69)  that the "aura of vagueness"  attached to many judgments  of 
personal probability might lead to systematic violations  of  his axioms although 
the decision  rule he discusses  as alternative - minimaxing regret -cannot, as 
mentioned in footnote 7 on p. 656 above, account for the behavior in our examples. 
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obviously unreliable or highly conflicting; or where expressed expecta- 
tions of  different individuals differ widely; or where expressed  con- 
fidence in estimates tends to be low.  Thus, as compared  with the 
effects of  familiar production decisions or well-known random processes 
(like coin flipping or roulette), the results of  Research and Develop- 
ment, or the performance  of  a new  President, or  the tactics of  an 
unfamiliar opponent are all likely to appear ambiguous.  This would 
suggest a broad field of  application for the proposition above. 
In terms of  Shackle's  cricket  example: Imagine  an American 
observer who had never heard of  cricket, knew none of  the rules or 
the method of  scoring, and had no clue as to the past record or present 
prospects of  England or Australia.  If he were confronted with a set 
of  side bets as to whether England would bat first -this to depend 
on the throw of  a die or a coin -I expect (unlike Shackle) that he 
would be found to obey Savage's axioms pretty closely, or at least, 
to want to obey them if  any discrepancies were pointed out.  Yet I 
should not be surprised by quite different behavior, at odds with the 
axioms, if  that particular observer were forced to gamble heavily on 
the proposition  that England would win the match. 
Let us suppose that an individual must choose among a certain 
set of  actions, to whose  possible consequences  we  can assign  "von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utilities"  (reflecting the fact that in choosing 
among some  set of  "unambiguous"  gambles involving other events 
and these same outcomes, he obeys the Savage axioms).  We shall 
suppose that by compounding various probability judgments of  vary- 
ing  degrees  of  reliability  he  can eliminate certain  probability  dis- 
tributions over the states of  nature as "unreasonable,"  assign weights 
to others and arrive at a composite "estimated"  distribution yo that 
represents all his available information on relative likelihoods.  But 
let us further suppose that the situation is ambiguous for him.  Out 
of  the set Y of  all possible distributions there remains  a set  Yo of 
distributions  that  still  seem  "reasonable,"  reflecting  judgments 
that he "might almost as well"  have made, or that his information -
perceived  as scanty, unreliable,  ambiguous -does  not  permit  him 
confidently to rule out. 
In choosing between two actions, I and 11, he can compute their 
expected  utilities in  terms  of  their  pay-offs  and the  "estimated!' 
probability distribution yo. If  the likelihoods of  the events in question 
were  as unambiguous  as those  in  the situations in  which  his  von 
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be  the end  of  the matter; these pay-offs embody all his  attitudes 
toward  "risk, ' and expected  values  will  correspond  to his  actual 
preferences among "risky"  gambles.  But in this case, where his final 
assignment  of  probabilities  is less  confident,  that calculation  may 
leave him uneasy.  "So  I has a lower expectation than 11, on the 
basis of  these estimates of  probabilities,"  he may reflect; "How much 
does that tell me?  That's not much of  a reason to choose 11." 
In this state of  mind, searching for additional grounds for choice, 
he may try new criteria, ask new questions.  For any of  the proba- 
bility distributions in the "reasonably possible"  set Yo,he can com- 
pute an expected value for each of  his actions.  It  might now occur 
to him to ask: "What might happen to me if  my best estimates of 
likelihood don't apply?  What is the worst of  the reasonable distribu- 
tions of  pay-off that I might associate with action I? With action II?" 
He might find that he  could answer this question  about the lower 
limit of  the reasonable expectations for a given action much more 
confidently than he could arrive at  a single, "best guess" expectation; 
the latter  estimate, he  might  suspect,  might  vary  almost  hourly 
with  his  mood,  whereas  the former  might  look  much  more solid, 
almost a "fact,"  a piece of  evidence definitely worth considering in 
making his choice.  In almost no cases  (excluding "complete  igno- 
rance"  as unrealistic)  will the only fact worth noting about a pro- 
spective action be its ((security  level":  the "worst"  of  the expecta- 
tions associated  with reasonably  possible  probability distributions. 
To choose on a "maximin"  criterion alone would be to ignore entirely 
those  probability  judgments  for which  there is evidence.  But in 
situations of  high ambiguity, such a criterion may appeal to a con- 
servative person as deserving some weight, when interrogation of  his 
own subjective estimates of  likelihood has failed to disclose a set of 
estimates that compel exclusive attention in his decision-making. 
If, in the end, such a person chooses action I, he may explain: 
In terms of  my best estimates of  probabilities, action I has almost as high  an 
expectation as action  11. But if  my best guesses should be rotten, which wouldn't 
surprise me, action I gives me better protection; the worst expectation that looks 
reasonably possible isn't much worse than the "best guess"  expectation, whereas 
with  action I1  it looks possible  that my  expectation  could  really  be  terrible. 
An  advocate  of  the Savage axioms  as normative criteria, fore- 
seeing where such reasoning mill lead, may interject in exasperation: 
Why are you double-counting the "worst"  possibilities?  They're already taken 
into account in your over-all estimates of  likelihoods, weighted  in a reasoned, 
realistic way that represents -by your own claim -your  best judgment.  Once 
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that's relevant, don't fiddle around with it, use it.  Stop asking irrelevant ques- 
tions and whining about how little you really know. 
But this may evoke the calm reply: 
It's no use bullying me into taking action I1 by flattering my "best judgment."  I 
know how little that's based on; I'd back it if  we were betting with pennies, but 
I want to know some other things if  the stakes are important, and "How much 
might I expect to lose, without  being unreasonable?"  just strikes me as one of 
those things.  As  for  the reasonableness  of  giving  extra weight  to the "bad" 
likelihoods, my test for that is pragmatic; in situations where I really can't judge 
confidently  among  a whole  range of  possible  distributions,  this  rule steers me 
toward actions whose expected values are relatively insensitive to the particular 
distribution  in  that range,  without giving up too much  in  terms of  the "best 
guess"  distribution.  That strikes me as a sensible, conservative rule to follow. 
lT7hat's wrong with it? 
"\T7hat's  wrong  with  it"  is  that  it  will  lead  to violations  of 
Savage's Postulate 2, and will make it impossible for an observer to 
describe the subject's choices as though he were maximizing a linear 
combination  of  pay-offs and probabilities  over events.  Neither  of 
these considerations, even on reflection, may pose to our conservative 
subject overwhelming  imperatives to change his behavior.  It will 
not  be  true that this behavior  is erratic or unpredictable  (we shall 
formalize it in terms of  a decision rule below), or exhibits intransi- 
tivities, or amounts to "throwing  away utility"  (as would be true, 
for example, if  it led him occasionally to choose strategies that were 
strongly ('dominated" by others).  There is, in fact, no obvious basis 
for asserting that it will lead him in the long run to worse outcomes 
than he could expect if  he reversed some of  his preferences to conform 
to the Savage axioms. 
Another  person,  or  this same  person  in  a  different  situation, 
might have turned instead or in addition to some other criteria for 
guidance.  One might ask, in an ambiguous situation: "What is the 
best  expectation I might  associate  with  this action, without  being 
unreasonable?"  Or: "What is its average expectation, giving all the 
reasonably  possible  distributions  equal  weight?"  The latter  con-
sideration would not, as it happens, lead to behavior  violating the 
Savage axioms.  The former would, in the same fashion though in 
the opposite direction as the "maximin"  criterion discussed  above; 
indeed, this "maximaxing"  consideration could generate the minority 
behavior of  those who, in our urn example, prefer I1 to I and I11 to IV. 
Both these patterns of  behavior could be described by a decision rule 
similar  to the one  below,  and their  respective  rationales might  be 
similar  to that given above.  But let us  continue to focus  on the 
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empirically  (at least, with respect to our examples) and because 
most frequently corresponds to advice to  be found on decision-makin 
in ambiguous situations. 
In reaching his decision, the relative weight that a conservati~ 
person will give to the question, "What is the worst expectation th: 
might appear reasonable?" will depend on his confidence in the judl 
ments that go into his estimated probability distribution.  The le 
confident  he  is,  the more  he  will  sacrifice  in  terms  of  estimatc 
expected pay-off  to achieve a given increase in "security  levelJ1;  tl 
more  confident,  the greater  increase  in  "security  level"  he  wou 
demand to compensate  for  a  given drop in estimated expectatio 
This implies  that "trades"  are possible between  security level ar 
estimated  expectation  in  his  preferences,  and  that  does  seem 
correspond  to observed responses.  Many subjects will  still  pref 
to bet on RII  than RI in our first example even when the proportic 
of  red to black in Urn I1 is lowered to 49:51, or will prefer to bet ( 
red than on yellow in the second example even when one red ball 
removed  from the urn.  But at some  point, as the "unambiguou 
likelihood  becomes  increasingly  unfavorable,  their  choices  w 
m witch.^ 
Assuming, purely for simplicity, that these factors enter into 1 
decision rule in linear combination, we can denote by p his degree 
confidence, in a given state of  information or ambiguity, in the es 
mated distribution yo, which in turn reflects all of  his judgments 
the relative likelihood of  distributions, including judgments of  eqL 
likelihood.  Let min,  be the minimum expected pay-off  to an act 
as the probability distribution ranges over the set Yo; let est,  be t 
expected  pay-off  to the act x  corresponding to the estimated  d 
tribution yo. 
The simplest  decision  rule  reflecting  the above consideratio 
would be? Associate with each x the index: 
p . est, + (1 - p) . min, 
Choose that act with the highest index. 
2. This contradicts the assertions by Chipman (op. cit., p. 88) and Geor 
scu-Roegen  ("Choice,  Expectations and Rleasurability,"  pp. 527-30), and ''I 
Nature of  Expectation and  Gncertainty,"  p. 25) that individuals  order unc 
tainty-situations lexicographically  in terms of  estimated expectation  and "crr 
bility"  (ambiguity); ambiguity appears to influence choice even when estima 
expectations are not equivalent. 
3. This rule  is  based  upon  the concept  of  a  "restricted  Bayes  solutic 
developed  by  J. L.  Hodges, Jr., and E.  L.  Lehmann  ("The  Uses  of  Previ 
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An equivalent formulation would be  the following, where yo is 
the estimated probability vector,  yPn the probability vector in  Yo 
corresponding to min,  for action x  and (X) is the vector of  payoffs 
for action x:  Associate with each x the index: 
[P . yo + (1 - P) y,m'"l(x) 
Choose that act with the highest index. 
In the case  of  the red,  yellow  and black  balls,  supposing no 
samples and no explicit information except that 1/3 of  the balls are 
red, many subjects might lean toward an estimated distribution  of 
(1/3, 113, 1,3)  : if  not from "ignorance,"  then from counterbalancing 
considerations.  But many of  these would find the situation ambigu- 
ous; for them the "reasonable"  distributions  Yo might be all those 
between  (1/3, 2/3, 0) and (1/3, 0, 213).  Assuming for purposes of 
illustratioll  p  = 1/4 (Yo, yo, X and p  are all subjective data to be 
inferred by an observer or supplied by the individual, depending on 
whether  the criterion is being  used  descriptively  or for convenient 
decision-making), the formula for the index would be: 
X . est,  + ?4min,. 
The relevant data (assigning arbitrary utility values of  6 and 0 to 
the money outcomes $100 and $0) would be: 
Red  Yellow  Black  Min,  Est,  Index 
A person conforming to this rule with these values would prefer I to 
I1 and IV to 111, in violation of  the Sure-thing Principle: as do most 
people  queried.  In justifying  this  pattern  of  behavior  he  might 
reproduce the rationale quoted above (q.v.) ;but most verbal explana- 
tions, somewhat less articulately, tend to be along these lines: 
Vol. 23 (Sept. 1952), pp. 396-407.  The discussion throughout Section I11 of  this 
paper derives heavily  from the Hodges and Lehmann argument, although their 
approach is motivated and rationalized somewhat differently. 
See also,  L. Hurwicz, "Some  Specification  Problems and Applications  to 
Econometric Models,"  Econometrica,  Vol. 19  (July 1951), pp. 343--44 (abstract). 
This deals with the same sort of  prbblem and presents a "generalized Bayes-mini- 
max principle"  equivalent, in more general form, to the decision rule I proposed 
in an earlier presentation of  this paper (December, 1960), but both of  these lacked 
the crucial notions developed  in the Hodges and Lehmann approach of  a "best 
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The expected pay-off  for action I is definite: 2.  The risks under action I1 may 
be  no  greater,  but I know what the risk  is  under action I and I don't  under 
action 11.  The expectation for action I1 is ambiguous,  it might be  better or it 
might be worse, anything from 0 to 4.  To be on the safe side, I'll assume that it's 
closer to 0; so action I looks better.  By the same token, IV looks better than 
111; I know that my expected pay-off with IV is 4, whereas with I11 it might be as 
low as 2  (which isn't compensated  by the chance that it could be 6).  In fact, I 
know the whole  probabzlzty  distrzbution of payoffs (though not  the distribution 
over events) for I and IV, but I don't for I1 and 111.  I know that a payoff of  6 
is twice as lzkely as 0 under IV, whereas 6 may be only half as likely as 0 under 111. 
Leaving the advocate of  the Savage axioms, if  he is still around 
to hear this, to  renew his complaints about the silliness and irrelevance 
of  such  considerations,  let us note  a  practical  consequence of  the 
decision  rule which  the above comment  brings into focus.  It has 
already been mentioned that the rule will favor -other things (such 
as the estimated expectation) being roughly equal -actions  whose 
expected  value is less sensitive to variation  of  the probability  dis- 
tribution within  the range  of  ambiguity.  Such  actions  may fre- 
quently be  those  definable as "status  quo"  or  "present  behavior" 
strategies.  For these,  p may be high, the range of  Yosmall. 
A familiar, ongoing pattern of  activity may be subject to con- 
siderable uncertainty, but this uncertainty is more apt to appear in 
the form of  "risk";  the relation between  given  states of  nature is 
known  precisely,  and although  the random  variation  in  the state 
of  nature which "obtains"  may be considerable, its stochastic proper- 
ties are often known confidently and in detail.  (Actually, this confi- 
dence  may be  self-deceptive,  based  on  ignoring  some  treacherous 
possibilities;  nevertheless,  it  commonly  exists.)  In  contrast,  the 
ambiguities  surrounding the outcome  of  a  proposed  innovation,  a 
departure  from  current  strategy,  may  be  much  more  noticeable. 
Different sorts of  events are relevant to its outcome, and their likeli- 
hoods must  now  be  estimated,  often  with  little evidence  or  prior 
expertise; and the effect of  a given state of  nature upon the outcome 
of  the new action may itself  be in question.  Its variance may not 
appear any higher  than that of  the familiar action when computed 
on the basis  of  "best  estimates"  of  the probabilities  involved, yet 
the meaningfulness of  this calculation may be subject to doubt.  The 
decision rule discussed will not preclude choosing such an act, but it 
will  definitely bias the choice away from such ambiguous  ventures 
and  toward  the  strategy  with  "known  risks."  Thus  the  rule  is 
L(conservative''  in a  sense more  familiar to everyday conversation 
than to statistical decision theory; it may ofterl favor traditional or 
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consequences are undeniably ambiguous.  This property may recom- 
mend it to some, discredit it with others (some of  whom might prefer 
to reverse  the rule, to emphasize the more hopeful  possibilities  in 
ambiguous situations); it does not seem irrelevant to one's attitude 
toward the behavior. 
In the equivalent formulation in terms of  y,"'" and yo,  the subject 
above could be described  "as though"  he were assigning weights to 
the respective pay-offs of  actions I1 and 111, whose expected values 
are ambiguous, as follows  (assuming yo = (1/3,  1/3, 1/3) in each 
case) : 
Y?""  P  .yo+ (I-P)  y,min 
Although the final set of  weights for each set of  pay-offs resemble 
probabilities (they are positive, sum to unity, and represent a linear 
combination of  two probability distributions), they differ for  each 
action, since y,"'n  will depend 011  the pay-offs for x and will vary for 
different  actions.  If  these weights were interpreted  as "probabili- 
ties,"  we would have to regard the subject's subjective probabilities 
as being dependent upon his pay-offs, his evaluation of  the outcomes. 
Thus, this model  would  be  appropriate to represent cases  of  true 
pessimism,  or  optimism  or  wishfulness  (with,  y,"""  substituting for 
ypn).  However,  in  this  case  we  are  assuming  conservatism,  not 
pessimism;  our  subject does not actually expect the worst, but he 
chooses to act ((as  though"  the  worst  were  somewhat more  likely than 
his  best  estimates  of  likelihood  would  indicate.  In either  case,  he 
violates the Savage axioms; it is impossible to infer from the result- 
ing behavior a set of  probabilities for events independent of  his pay- 
offs.  In effect, he "distorts"  his best estimates of  likelihood, in the 
direction of  increased  emphasis on the less favorable outcomes and 
to a degree depending an p, his confidence in his best e~timate.~ 
4.  This interpretation of  the behavior-pattern contrasts to the hypothesis 
or decision rule advanced  by Fellner in the accompanying article in this sympo- 
sium.  Fellner seems unmistakably to be dealing with the same phenomena dis- 
cussed here, and his proposed technique of  measuring a person's  subjective prob- 
abilities and utilities in relatively "unambiguous"  situations and then using these 
measurements  to  calibrate  his  uncertainty  in  more  ambiguous  environments 
seems to me a most valuable source of  new  data and hypotheses.  Moreover, his 668  QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF  ECONOMICS 
Not only does this decision model account for "deviant"  behav-
ior in a particular, ambiguous situation, but it covers the observed 
shift in a subject's behavior as ambiguity decreases.  Suppose that a 
sample is drawn from the urn,  strengthening the confidence in the 
best  estimates of  likelihood,  so that p  increases, say, to x.  The 
weights for the pay-offs to actions I1 and I11 would now be: 
P  . yo + (I-P)  yFn 
and the over-all index would be:  Index 
In other words, the relative influence of  the consideration, "What  is 
the worst to be expected?" upon the comparison of  actions is lessened. 
The final weights approach closer to the "best estimate" values, and 
I  and I1 approach closer to indifference,  as do I11 and IV.  This 
latter aspect might show up behaviorally in the amount a subject is 
willing to pay for a given bet on yellow, or on  (red or black), in the 
two situations. 
In the limit, as ambiguity diminishes for one reason  or another 
and p  approaches  1, the estimated  distribution  will  come increas- 
ingly to dominate decision.  With confidence in the best  estimates 
high, behavior on the basis of  the proposed decision rule will roughly 
conform to the Savage axioms, and it would be possible to infer the 
estimated  probabilities  from  observed  choices.  But prior  to this, 
a large number of  information states, distinguishable from each other 
and all far removed from "complete  ignorance,"  might all be  suffi- 
descriptive data and intuitive conjectures lend encouraging support to the find- 
ings reported here.  However, his solution to the problem supposes a single set of 
weights  determined independently of  pay-offs  (presumably corresponding to the 
"best estimates" here) and a "correction factor," reflecting the degree of  ambiguity 
or confidence,  which operates on these weights in a manner independent of  the 
structure of  pay-offs.  I am not entirely clear on the behavioral implications  of 
Fellner's  model or the decision  rule it implies,  but in view of  these properties I 
am doubtful  whether it can  account adequately for all the behavior discussed 
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ciently ambiguous as to lead many decision-makers to conform to the 
above decision rule with p  < 1, in clear violation of  the axioms. 
Are they foolish?  It is not the object of  this paper  to judge 
that.  I have been concerned rather to advance the testable proposi- 
tions:  (I) certain information  states can be  meaningfully identified 
as highly  ambiguous;  (2) in  these  states, many reasonable  people 
tend to violate the Savage axioms with  respect  to certain choices; 
(3) their behavior is deliberate and not readily reversed upon reflec- 
tion; (4) certain patterns of  "violating" behavior can be distinguished 
and described in terms of  a specified decision rule. 
If  these  propositions  should  prove  valid,  the question  of  the 
optimality of  this behavior would gain more interest.  The mere fact 
that it conflicts with certain axioms of  choice that at first glance 
appear reasonable does not seem to me  to foreclose this question; 
empirical  research,  and  even  preliminary  speculation,  about  the 
nature of  actual or  "successful"  decision-making  under uncertainty 
is still too young  to give us confidence that these axioms  are not 
abstracting away from vital considerations.  It  would seem incautious 
to rule peremptorily  that the people  in  question  should not allow 
their perception of  ambiguity, their unease with their best estimates 
of  probability,  to  influence  their  decision:  or  to assert  that the 
manner in which they respond to it is against their long-run interest 
and that they would be  in some sense better off  if  they should go 
against their deep-felt preferences.  If  their rationale for their deci- 
sion behavior is not uniquely compelling (and recent discussions with 
T. Schelling have raised questions in my mind about it), neither, it 
seems to me, are the counterarguments.  Indeed, it seems out of the 
question  summarily  to judge  their  behavior  as  irrational:  I  am 
included among them. 
In any case, it follows from the propositions above that for their 
behavior  in  the  situations  in  question,  the  Bayesian  or  Savage 
approach gives wrong  predictions  and, by their lights, bad advice. 
They act in conflict with the axioms deliberately, without apology, 
because  it seems to them  the sensible  way  to behave.  Are  they 
clearly mistaken? 
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